{{ t("PT Matahari Putra Prima Tbk") }}

{{ t("Company development") }}

{{ t("Source: case, printed p. 587. These milestones summarize the case’s history.") }}

{{ t("The stores behind the names") }}

{{ t("Images:") }} {{ t("MPPA official website") }}{{ t(". These images illustrate the brands; they do not document 2020 store conditions. The Hypermart promotion dates from 2025; other photo dates are not established here.") }}

{{ t("The retail portfolio") }}

{{ t("Seven formats across large stores, small stores, and wholesale") }}

{{ t("Format") }}	{{ t("Business type") }}	{{ t("Role in the business") }}
{{ t("Hypermart") }}	{{ t("Large-format hypermarket") }}	{{ t("A broad assortment including groceries, fresh food, electronics, and soft-line goods. The case identifies middle-income families as its target customers.") }}
{{ t("Foodmart") }}	{{ t("Supermarket") }}	{{ t("Convenient shopping with local and international products, fresh food, and ready-to-eat meals.") }}
{{ t("Primo") }}	{{ t("Premium supermarket") }}	{{ t("An upscale offer for affluent customers, with imported products and gourmet ready-to-eat meals.") }}
{{ t("Hyfresh") }}	{{ t("Neighborhood supermarket") }}	{{ t("Fresh groceries and attractive prices for frequent purchases in middle-class communities.") }}
{{ t("Boston HBC") }}	{{ t("Health and beauty") }}	{{ t("Personal care, cosmetics, and wellness products. Selected stores provide consultations and pharmacy services.") }}
{{ t("FMX") }}	{{ t("Convenience store") }}	{{ t("Ready-to-eat food, beverages, and snacks near residential areas and transit locations, with bill-payment services.") }}
{{ t("SmartClub") }}	{{ t("Wholesale") }}	{{ t("The wholesale format identified in the case’s portfolio classification.") }}

{{ t("Source: case, Exhibit 4 and format descriptions, printed pp. 590–592.") }}

{{ t("Hypermart’s role") }}

{{ t("Hypermart contributed approximately") }} {{ t("85% of MPPA’s revenue in 2020") }}{{ t(". Foodmart and Primo together contributed approximately 10%, while other formats contributed approximately 5%. These figures describe revenue contribution; they do not establish each format’s profitability.") }}

{{ t("Source: case, Exhibit 5, printed p. 590.") }}

{{ t("The setting for the case") }}

{{ t("The case places MPPA amid COVID-19 restrictions, changing shopping behavior, and growing use of online retail. MPPA was developing its online channels while reviewing the role and size of its physical stores. The assignment asks for a strategic plan covering 2021–2025.") }}

{{ t("Source: case, printed pp. 587, 589–590, and 594. Choosing the preferred strategy belongs in the later analysis.") }}

{{ t("The structure shown in the case") }}

{{ t("Exhibit 1 places CEO Elliot Dickson above eight management roles. Large stores and small stores have separate directors, alongside functional leadership. The case does not show a COO or a president for each individual retail format.") }}

{{ t("Source: case, printed pp. 587–588, Exhibit 1. The interactive slide reproduces the simplified hierarchy in that exhibit; it is not a complete governance chart.") }}

{{ t("What needs assessment") }}

{{ t("The authors question whether accountability across the formats is clear enough and suggest considering a COO and individual format heads. These are proposals to evaluate. The chart alone does not establish that a missing role caused the company’s losses or that adding management positions would improve results.") }}

{{ t("Separate company statements from the authors’ illustration") }}

{{ t("The case reports that no vision or mission statement was posted on the company website or in the most recent annual report it reviewed. This is the textbook’s historical account, not an independently verified claim about the company today.") }}

{{ t("“To become the premier, multi-format, go-to shopping destination throughout Indonesia.”") }}

{{ t("This is the case authors’ suggested vision. The case supplies no corresponding mission statement in that section.") }}

{{ t("Initial assessment") }}

{{ t("The suggested vision identifies a retail business, Indonesia as the market, and a multi-format approach. It leaves the intended customers and distinctive reason to choose MPPA broad. We should assess those choices through the external and internal analyses before developing a proposed vision and a mission with the required components.") }}

{{ t("Source: case, printed p. 587. Proposed statements will be developed after the strategy assessment.") }}

{{ t("The problem and the decision") }}

{{ t("MPPA faces continuing operating losses and limited financial capacity while relying on Hypermart for approximately 85% of revenue. The strategic question is how it should allocate resources across store formats and online channels to achieve sustainable profitability.") }}

{{ t("Evidence behind the statement") }}

{{ t("Why the interest increase outweighed the operating improvement") }}

{{ t("Operating loss narrowed from Rp196.105bn to Rp140.268bn, an EBIT improvement of Rp55.837bn. Interest expense rose from Rp118.496bn to Rp267.419bn, an increase of Rp148.923bn. The additional interest exceeded the EBIT improvement by Rp93.086bn. Accordingly, pretax loss increased from Rp314.601bn to Rp407.687bn, also a deterioration of Rp93.086bn.") }}

{{ t("Reconciliation:") }} {{ t("Rp148.923bn additional interest − Rp55.837bn EBIT improvement = Rp93.086bn increase in pretax loss.") }}

{{ t("In 2019, current liabilities of Rp2,618.390bn exceeded current assets of Rp1,904.047bn by Rp714.343bn. The corresponding 2020 shortfall was Rp1,227.833bn, an increase of Rp513.490bn. Both years therefore had negative working capital, with a larger gap in 2020.") }}

{{ t("At year-end 2020, current assets were Rp1,535.266bn and current liabilities were Rp2,763.099bn. Their difference was −Rp1,227.833bn, or approximately −Rp1.23tn. This indicates constrained short-term financial capacity; it does not by itself establish when every payment is due.") }}

{{ t("Source: case, printed pp. 588–590, Exhibits 2, 3, and 5. Units in the original financial exhibits are millions of rupiah; this section converts them to billions and trillions.") }}

{{ t("Keep symptoms separate from explanations") }}

{{ t("Losses, declining sales, and the liquidity gap establish performance pressure. The case discusses pandemic restrictions and shopping behavior, but these do not establish all causes of the losses. MPPA was already recording an operating loss in 2019. Hypermart’s revenue concentration makes its performance important, without proving that concentration itself caused poor results.") }}

{{ t("Alternatives remain open") }}

{{ t("Improving existing Hypermart stores, selectively resizing or exiting locations, investing in smaller formats, and developing economically viable online services remain alternatives to assess. The problem statement does not assume which option will win. PESTLE is the next analysis.") }}

{{ t("PESTLE analysis") }}

{{ t("This analysis uses external evidence published in 2020–2021, with older comparison periods identified. It supports the case’s 2021–2025 planning exercise. No 2022–2026 outcomes are used to select a strategy. Indonesian institutional sources checked on 5 November 2026.") }}

{{ t("How the textbook guides this analysis") }}

{{ t("Chapter 3 groups external forces into economic; social, cultural, demographic and environmental; political, governmental and legal; technological; and competitive forces. PESTLE separates some of these into the six headings requested for the presentation. Competitive forces require the later Five Forces and competitor analyses, so PESTLE alone is not a complete external assessment.") }}

{{ t("David’s AQCD test asks whether a factor helps inform action, includes quantities where possible, compares conditions across time, and relates to products, divisions or regions. The textbook also requires genuinely external facts, rather than proposed strategies presented as opportunities. The analysis below keeps the external evidence separate from interpretation and candidate responses.") }}

{{ t("Textbook basis: Chapter 3, printed pp. 95–99, especially the AQCD discussion on pp. 95–96.") }} {{ t("Open the textbook") }}{{ t(".") }}

{{ t("What the evidence does and does not justify") }}

{{ t("The factors support comparing customer access, price and assortment choices, checkout convenience, compliance, and perishable inventory economics. They do not select a winning store format or prove that online expansion will be profitable. Company-level sales declines, debt and current liabilities belong to the internal assessment, rather than the PESTLE factor list.") }}

{{ t("Macro statistics are not divisional measurements. Mapping them to Hypermart, Hyfresh or a Jakarta location improves relevance but does not create missing format-level evidence. No AQCD score, EFE weight or response rating is assigned simply to fill the template.") }}

{{ t("Political and legal factors share a boundary. Pandemic operating policy is classified under Political; the specific shopping-bag obligation sits under Legal. Avoid counting the same condition twice when selecting factors for EFE.") }}

{{ t("Source register") }}

1. {{ t(source.title) }}{{ t(source.date) }} {{ t("·") }} {{ t(source.locator) }}{{ t("Open saved report") }}

{{ t("Open the evidence ledger") }}{{ t(". All response options remain provisional.") }}